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ABSTRACT 
This paper specifies an empirical framework for estimating both technical and 
allocative efficiency, which is applied to a large panel of European banks over the 
years 1996 to 2003. Our methodology allows for self-consistent measurement of 
technical and allocative inefficiency, in an effort to address the issue known in the 
literature as the Greene problem.  The results suggest that, on average, European 
banks exhibit constant returns to scale, that technical and allocative efficiency are 
close to 80% and 75% respectively, and that overall economic efficiency shows a 
clearly improving trend. We also show through the comparison of various estimators 
that models incorporating only technical efficiency tend to overestimate it. 
 
 
Keywords: Technical and allocative efficiency; Translog cost function; Maximum 
likelihood; European banking 
JEL classification: C13; G21; L2 
 
 
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Heather Gibson and Theodora 
Kosma for very helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Greece. 
 
 
 
 
 
Correspondence: 
Sophocles N. Brissimis 
Economic Research Department,  
Bank of Greece, 21 E. Venizelos Ave., 
102 50 Athens, Greece, 
Tel. +30 210 320 2388 
Email: sbrissimis@bankofgreece.gr1. Introduction 
It has been established that banks, in their role as financial intermediaries, 
contribute significantly to economic activity in a number of ways. During the last two 
decades the banking sector has experienced major transformations worldwide in its 
operating environment. Both external and domestic factors have affected its structure, 
efficiency and performance. An efficient banking sector is better able to withstand 
negative shocks and contribute to the stability of the financial system. Therefore, the 
efficiency of banks has attracted the interest of international research. 
Several studies have estimated bank efficiency using either parametric or non-
parametric frontiers.
1 Yet, few studies have attempted to offer a cross-country 
comparison of the efficiency of the European banking system and none, to our 
knowledge, has jointly estimated its technical and allocative efficiency. Studies that 
estimate the efficiency of European banks, using standard techniques, include Pastor 
et al. (1997), Dietsch and Weill (1998), Altunbas et al. (2001), Altunbas and 
Chakravarty (2001), Maudos et al. (2002), Bikker (2002) and Casu and Molyneux 
(2003).  
Use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to estimate bank efficiency 
presents well-known difficulties in incorporating a stochastic component in the 
statistical model. Similarly, the decomposition of overall cost efficiency into its 
technical
2 and allocative
3 components using flexible functional forms has proved to 
be problematic, since the implied production function cannot be derived. For this 
reason, researchers have been content to either ignore allocative inefficiency or 
impose ad hoc restrictions to integrate it in an empirical model.  
The novel feature of the present paper is that it extends the existing literature 
by modeling both technical and allocative inefficiency of European banks within a 
stochastic frontier framework, using the implications of the relationship derived in 
                                                 
1 There are three main parametric frontier approaches to measuring efficiency, namely the stochastic 
frontier approach (SFA), the distribution free approach (DFA) and the thick frontier approach (TFA). 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is the most common among the non-parametric approaches, which 
also include the free disposal hull (FDH). For a thorough description of these approaches, see Berger 
and Humphrey (1997). A limited number of studies use distance functions to measure efficiency (e.g. 
English et al.). 
2 Technical efficiency (TE) reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximal output from a given set of 
inputs. 
3 Allocative efficiency (AE) reflects the ability of a firm to use the inputs in optimal proportions, given 
their respective prices. The product of TE and AE is overall economic efficiency (EE). 
  5Kumbhakar (1997). Unlike Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005) who use a relatively 
complex Bayesian approach, we present an approximate solution that is relatively 
easy to implement since we provide a log-likelihood function for this model in closed 
form. We obtain technical and allocative inefficiency for individual banks at each 
point in time, by applying a cross sectional maximum likelihood estimation method to 
a panel of European banks, and then, for expositional brevity, present averages on a 
country-specific basis and for the European banking system as a whole. 
The results suggest that, on average, European banks are characterized by 
constant returns to scale, although the conventional estimation methods tend to 
slightly underestimate the magnitude of scale efficiencies. Most importantly, models 
that include only technical inefficiency significantly overestimate it (strong evidence 
for this is found for countries like Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden). However, 
both technical and allocative efficiency (TE and AE, respectively) have shown a 
tendency to improve in recent years, as banks apply better managerial practices in 
order to enhance their overall performance.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief review 
of the literature, followed in Section 3 by the theoretical model. Section 4 deals with 
the estimation methodology. Section 5 discusses the data and the empirical results 
and, finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.    
 
2. Brief review of the literature 
Greene (1980) defined allocative inefficiency as the departure of the actual 
cost shares from the optimum shares, failing, in such a context, to derive the 
relationship between allocative inefficiency and cost increases from such inefficiency 
(Greene problem). Since then, the literature has proposed an approximate relationship 
to model allocative inefficiency in the fashion of Schmidt (1984) who modeled the 
cost of allocative inefficiency as the product of the errors in the cost share equations 
and a specified positive semi-definite matrix. However, this approximate relationship 
is not free of problems, as it may lead to inconsistencies that bias the results by 
unknown magnitudes and in unknown directions. 
  Kumbhakar (1997), in an important contribution that followed the definition 
of allocative inefficiency in Schmidt and Lovell (1979), used a translog cost function 
  6and established an exact relationship between allocative inefficiency in the cost share 
equations and in the cost function. Empirical estimation of this model has been 
restricted to panel datasets in which technical and allocative inefficiency are either 
assumed to be fixed parameters or functions of the data and unknown parameters 
(Maietta, 2002). Application of such a model in banking has been limited to 
Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005). Their model reduces to a nonlinear seemingly 
unrelated regression with nonlinear random effects, which they estimate using panel 
data on U.S. commercial banks. They show that the inclusion of allocative 
inefficiency in the model produces some notable differences from simple models of 
technical efficiency, since failure of banks to efficiently allocate their inputs leads to 
further increases in costs. 
A number of studies offer a European cross-country comparison of bank 
efficiency, using standard efficiency estimation methods.
4 Pastor et al. (1997) used a 
DEA technique to define a common frontier for EU countries that incorporated the 
effect of differences in the economic environment across countries. Their results 
indicate that countries like Germany, Denmark, Spain, Luxembourg and France had 
high efficiency scores, although inclusion of the country-specific control variables 
significantly lowered them. A similar approach was employed by Lozano-Vivas et al. 
(2002). Dietsch and Weill (1998) used unconsolidated data from 11 EU countries 
covering the years 1992-1996 to model efficiency using cost and profit frontiers. 
Their results show a mixed picture across countries, which is sometimes at odds with 
the rest of the literature, and their most important finding is that European integration 
has had a positive effect on bank efficiency.    
Bikker (2002) used a panel of banks from the 15 EU member states over the 
years 1990-1997 and stochastic frontier methods, which clearly show an increasing 
trend in efficiency over time and large efficiency and cost differences among 
countries, with Luxembourg, Germany, the UK and Denmark being the most efficient 
and Belgium, Greece and Italy at the other end. Altunbas et al. (2001) and Altunbas 
and Chakravarty (2001), used both the translog and the flexible Fourier functional 
forms to suggest that scale economies are widespread for small banks (even though 
the trend is declining), with inefficiencies ranging between 20 and 25%, while banks 
reduced total cost by around 3% per annum between 1989 and 1997 due to technical 
                                                 
4 For a thorough review of these studies see Molyneux et al. (2001). 
  7progress (which mainly affects larger banks).  Most recently, Casu and Molyneux 
(2003) applied DEA to five EU countries, whereby they identified a trend toward 
higher efficiency and reported that the banking systems of Germany and the UK are 
the most efficient.  
While the above literature provides significant evidence on European bank 
efficiency, no attempt has been made to model allocative inefficiency within a 
framework that offers an empirical solution to the Greene problem. This paper aims to 
add to the existing literature in this direction and extend the time frame of the dataset 
beyond 1997.     
 
3. Theoretical model 
In this section we follow Kumbhakar (1997), who derived an exact 
relationship between allocative inefficiency and cost therefrom in the context of the 
translog cost function. Assume  j ξ  represents (time-invariant) allocative inefficiency 
for the input pair (j,1)  so that the relevant input price vector (often labeled as shadow 
price vector) to the firm is (  = ( ,  ≡
* w ) ,..., , (
* *
2 1 M w w w 1 w ) exp( 2 2 ξ w ,…, exp( )) JJ w ξ , 
where  2,..., J ξ ξ  are random variables. Kumbhakar (1997) showed that the translog 
system (with a single output) can be written as follows.
5
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and a non-negative disturbance representing technical inefficiency. C
a
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a
it j S ,
0
,it j S it v i u
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minimum cost function, with arguments w
* and y (the firm’s output), derived from a 
simple cost minimization problem. We assume, for the time being, only a cross 
sectional dimension i.  , ji η and   are functions of allocative inefficiency,  ln i G 2,..., J ξ ξ  
defined below. We rewrite the actual cost function as 
0 ln ln ln
aA L
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where  can be interpreted as the percentage increase in 
*0 ln ( ln ln ln )
AL
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5 The multiple output generalization of this result is straightforward. 
  8cost due to allocative inefficiency and   is the translog cost frontier.
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Thus,  , ji η  are the deviations of the actual cost shares from their optimum values, and 
are non-linear functions of allocative inefficiency,  2,..., J ξ ξ , and data.  
 
4. Estimation 
The system to be estimated is 
0 ln ln ln ( )
aA L CCC v ξ =+ + + u                         (9) 
0 ()
a
jj j SS η ξ =+ , 1,..., 1 j J = − ,                       (10) 
                                                 
6 This is non-negative given strict concavity of the cost function. See also Kumbhakar (1997). 
  9where the definitions of ln ( )
AL C ξ  and  ( ) j η ξ  have been given above, and   
represents input-oriented technical inefficiency. Since l
0 u ≥
n ( )
AL C ξ  and  ( ) j η ξ  are 
highly complicated functions of ξ , estimation of this model is challenging, a problem 
known in the literature as the Greene problem (Bauer, 1990). As we already 
mentioned, although Kumbhakar (1987) presented the model, he did not provide an 
estimation technique, while Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005) presented a Bayesian 
approach, which rests on the introduction of additional error terms in the share 
equations. Here, we provide an approximate solution that can be easily implemented 
in practice, since we provide a log-likelihood function for this model in closed form. 
More specifically, we consider a first order Taylor series expansion of the cost 
function and the share equations about  1 0J ξ − = , whose details have been presented 
before in Kumbhakar and Tsionas (2005) and are reproduced in the appendix for 
convenience. It is shown there that, to first order of approximation, l , and  n ( ) 0
AL C ξ 
1
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j
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Denoting  , which is a  , [ ii j AA = ( 1) ( 1) JJ − ×−  symmetric matrix for the i
th 
observation, we have, to first order of approximation, 
0 ln ln
a
ii i CC v ++  i u                           (12) 
0
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It should be noted that  , where 
00 0 () ii i AB S S d i a g S ′ =+ − i jh B β ⎡⎤ = ⎣⎦ .   is 
precisely the matrix whose negative semi-definiteness implies concavity of the 
translog cost function (Diewert and Wales, 1987, p. 48) and it can be shown that its 
elements are the elasticities of substitution. It is also remarkable that a first order 
expansion makes the cost function independent of 
i A
i ξ s, a fact that will be of 
considerable use in formulating the likelihood function of the model.  
  10To proceed with estimation, we assume that 
2 ~( 0 ,) iv vNσ , 
2 ~( 0 , iu uN ) σ + , 
1 ~( 0 , iJ N ) ξ − Σ . All the error terms are assumed to be i.i.d., mutually independent, and 
independent of the predetermined variables (prices, outputs etc). Under these 
assumptions it is clear that  1 ~( 0 ,   ii i J i i AN A A ) η ξ − =Σ . The implication of modeling 
allocative inefficiency along the lines of Kumbhakar (1987) is that the error terms of 
the system, namely the  i η s, are no longer i.i.d.; in particular they have to exhibit 
heteroscedasticity of a special form. Notice that heteroscedasticity here depends on β  
through the dependence of   on the derived shares,  .  i A
0
i S
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The second part of this expression is the familiar likelihood function of a half-normal 
cost frontier.
7
Taking logarithms and concentrating out Σ, we get the estimator
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7 See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 76-77). 
8  In the derivation it is useful to notice that matrices Ai and Σ are symmetric. 
  11Relative to a cost-share system with technical inefficiency, the additional term 
 reflects the heteroscedasticity in the share equation residuals that must 
be accounted for in estimation by ML. Since this term depends on 
1
ln || ||
n
i
i
A
=
−∑
β  it is not possible 
to obtain consistent estimators of β  by estimating a cost-share system with 
homoscedastic error terms in the share equations. It is possible to get an estimator that 
accounts for the Jacobian term by assuming that shares are close to zero, in which 
case we obtain  . This approximation makes the additional 
term independent of the particular observation so the log-likelihood function can be 
easily programmed in standard econometric software. In the case of three inputs, for 
example, this term is simply 
1
1
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n
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i
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2
11 22 12 11 22 1 n ββ β β β ⎡ − −−+ ⎣⎦ .  In our empirical work we 
use the exact log-likelihood function given above without resorting to this 
approximation. The reason is that this approximation, although simple to use, is 
inconsistent with the presence of heteroscedasticity in the share equation residuals. 
Given parameter estimates derived from ML, it is possible to obtain measures 
of bank-specific technical and allocative inefficiency. Bank-specific technical 
inefficiency can be obtained using  
() *
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where 
22 2
* / vu σ σσ σ = , see Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p. 78). 
Given the share equation residuals  ( ) i η β , we obtain the price distortions as 
1 () () ii i A ξ βη
− = β
i
 from which we can obtain the cost of allocative inefficiency as 
ˆ ln ln ( ( ))
AL AL
i CC ξ β = . Estimated parameter values are substituted for β , λ , and σ  
above.  
ML estimation has proved difficult primarily because numerical derivatives 
are not accurate enough, at least in our application, and/or because obtaining the log 
of the normal cdf is dangerous for large negative values of the argument. For this 
reason we have used a Nelder-Mead simplex maximization technique which does not 
require derivatives. Derivatives are, however, needed to obtain the standard errors of 
  12the parameters. To obtain standard errors we have resorted to a Metropolis-Hastings 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo technique (Tierney, 1994) to draw a sample from the 
posterior distribution of the model and use the estimated standard errors of the 
parameter draws to gain an appreciation of the curvature of the log-likelihood around 
its mode.
 9 We have used flat priors to obtain the posterior, which we call  ( | ) p Y θ , 
and Y  denotes the data.  
The particular version of the Metropolis-Hastings scheme used is as follows. 
Given the estimated covariance matrix V  of a cost-share system with technical but no 
allocative inefficiency, we draw a proposal 

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effects. The sample {
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}
(), 1,...,
i iM θ =  converges to the distribution whose density is 
proportional to the posterior kernel  ( | ) p Y θ . The posterior mean is estimated by 
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. The square roots of the diagonal elements of this 
matrix can be used as standard errors associated with the ML estimate of the model 
that we obtained via the Nelder-Mead procedure. Since the posterior means derived 
from the Bayesian approach are very close to the ML parameter estimates, we only 
report the latter. 
 
 
 
9 We have also tried the inverse of the numerical Hessian and the BHHH approximation as well as the 
Gill-Murray generalized Cholesky decomposition of the generalized inverse of the Hessian (Gill and 
King, 2004) without success.  
  135. Data and empirical results 
5.1 Data 
The proposed method is applied to a sample of European commercial banks 
for the period 1996 to 2003. We choose to limit the empirical analysis to the 
unconsolidated statements of commercial banks in order to reduce the possibility of 
introducing aggregation bias in the results. All necessary data is obtained from the 
BankScope database and includes 13 of the 15 EU countries.
10  
The first problem encountered in bank efficiency studies is the definition and 
measurement of output. The two most widely used approaches are the ‘production’
11 
and the ‘intermediation’
12 approaches. While we acknowledge that it would probably 
be best to employ both approaches to identify whether the results are biased when 
using a different set of outputs, sufficient data to perform such an analysis on 
European banks is generally unavailable. Hence, this study uses the ‘intermediation 
approach’ for two main reasons: First, this approach is inclusive of interest expenses 
that usually account for over one-half of total costs and second the BankScope 
database lacks the necessary data for implementation of the production approach. 
Having defined the methodological approach to be followed, we focus our 
attention on the selection of variables. Table 1 reports the variables to be used, along 
with some descriptive statistics. We use a dual approach that captures both the input 
and output characteristics of deposits, in the sense that interest expenses include 
interest paid on deposits, while deposits are associated with a substantial amount of 
liquidity and payment services provided to depositors (see Berger and Humphrey, 
1997). We generate input prices by dividing all their respective costs by total assets, 
given that BankScope does not include comprehensive information on input 
quantities.
13
                                                 
10 Greece and Finland are excluded from the analysis due to data limitations.  
11 Under this approach output is measured by the number of transactions or documents processed over a 
given time period (see Berger and Humphrey, 1997). 
12 Under this approach output is measured in terms of values of stock variables (such as loans, deposits, 
etc.) appearing in bank accounts. 
13 Clearly, it is possible that defining the price of inputs in terms of output could result in some bias 
against e.g. those banks, which hire high quality and, therefore, relatively high cost staff. This potential 
bias is mitigated, however, given that banks with higher quality staff should expect to see some benefit 
in terms of output. Hence, providing that the high quality staff is sufficiently productive, such banks 
will not be disadvantaged from a relative efficiency point of view.   
  14Finally, following the literature (e.g. Altunbas et al.) the analysis includes a 
time trend (T) and a capital variable (E). The time trend is intended to capture 
technological change in the period examined; thus, the partial derivative of cost with 
respect to T gives the impact of technical change. The capital ratio (equity/assets) 
serves as a proxy for capital adequacy, included in the cost function to control for 
risk.
14  
 
5.2 Empirical results 
  So far we have presented the model for technical efficiency with a single 
output. We rewrite it here for the three output-three input case
15 using the translog 
functional form: 
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The assumptions about the noise components and the technical inefficiency 
component (u) are the same as before. The model incorporating allocative inefficiency 
is the above system of equations amplified with the system comprised of equations (9) 
and (10). The methodology described in Section 4 provides efficiency estimates for 
each cross sectional unit (bank) at each point in time. In other words, we are able to 
get efficiency estimates equal to the number of observations. Due to space 
 
14Berger (1995) suggests that relaxation of the perfect capital markets assumption allows an increase in 
capital to raise expected earnings, by reducing the expected costs of financial distress. Clearly, a well-
capitalized bank is better able to absorb unexpected credit losses and provide safety for depositors and 
creditors. On the other hand, too much capital reduces the bank’s ability to maximize returns. 
15 We impose homogeneity by dividing all inputs by physical capital (the third input). 
  15considerations we calculate and present country as well as year averages, based on 
these estimates.   
In Table 2 we report estimation results with five different methods: The first is 
a simple OLS regression on the translog cost function, the second is a SUR on the 
translog cost share system, the third is a SUR on the translog cost share system with 
technical efficiency (SURT) followed by a ML estimate obtained from Nelder-Mead 
simplex as described in Section 3, and finally estimation of approximate translog cost 
share system with both technical and allocative inefficiency (SURT&A). 
A first comment regarding the results is that the capital ratio is negatively and 
significantly correlated with total cost. This implies that the perfect capital markets 
assumption may not hold. This result is consistent with most of the literature that 
examines such a relationship, including Berger (1995) and models of the so-called 
Structure-Conduct Performance hypothesis (SCP) (for a review of these models see 
Goddard et al., 2001).   
We estimate scale economies
16 for all banks and report their temporal 
variation (by averaging the bank-specific values across years) and overall mean 
obtained from the four estimation methods  (Table 3). The results suggest that, in 
general, constant returns to scale are prevalent in the European banking system. The 
evidence of the lack of scale economies, on average, is generally consistent with most 
of the recent literature on bank efficiency of developed banking systems (for example 
see Humphrey and Vale, 2004). On the other hand, Altunbas et al. (2001) identify 
positive returns to scale for a large sample of European banks spanning an earlier 
period (1989-1997).
17 The results obtained from the different estimation methods 
present small differences among themselves. The model without allocative 
inefficiency seems to slightly underestimate overall scale economies. On average, 
there is a trend toward decreasing returns to scale in European banking (although the 
overall change is smaller than 1%). These findings are consistent with the belief that 
                                                 
16 Scale economies are obtained by differentiating the cost function in each of the four models, i.e. the 
simple OLS on the translog (OLS), the SUR on the translog cost share system (SUR), the SUR on the 
translog cost share system with technical efficiency (SURT) and the SUR on the translog cost share 
system with both technical and allocative efficiency (SURT&A), with respect to output. 
17 Additionally, the European Commission (1997), investigating the cost characteristics of various 
European banking sectors, reported that as banking systems approach a higher level of sophistication in 
terms of technology and productivity, opportunities from exploiting economies of scale may be quite 
limited. Nevertheless, for a better analysis of scale economies one should distinguish between 
differently-sized banks. 
  16the European banking system has exploited whatever returns to scale were available 
and that recently the drive to improved performance has come from greater efficiency. 
Some average efficiency measures are given in Table 4 and are illustrated in 
Figures 1 through 5, showing significant variation between countries and over time.
18 
Table 4 shows that the model without allocative inefficiency (i.e. column 1) 
overestimates the overall TE by a considerable amount (approximately 9%). 
Furthermore, SURT reports a fall by roughly 2% in TE during the sample period, 
while SURT&A reports a 5 % rise, which of course is closer to what would be expected 
given the wave of consolidation and financial innovation in the European banking 
system during the sample period (see ECB, 2002). Allocative inefficiency stands at 
almost 25% for the whole period, with the trend since 1996 being noticeably 
downward (16% in 2003). The results clearly suggest that inefficiencies are more 
important than scale economies for European banks. Country-wise the lowest 
efficiency scores were found to be those of Ireland, Portugal and Sweden, countries 
that, interestingly enough, report comparatively high technical efficiency scores when 
allocative inefficiency is not being modeled. The best-practice countries are Germany, 
Austria and the UK, with average technical and allocative efficiency scores close to 
80%. 
Comparison with previous studies in terms of efficiency scores cannot be 
made directly since we utilize data from 1997 onwards, the endpoint of the datasets in 
most of the recent literature. However, our findings regarding the most efficient 
banking sectors are similar to those in Altunbas et al. (2001), Bikker (2002) and Casu 
and Molyneux (2003), with the exception of Belgium whose banking system seems to 
operate at a significantly improved efficiency level. It also seems that at the beginning 
of our data period (1996) the average efficiency level of our dataset is higher than that 
of Altunbas et al. (2001) when we do not incorporate allocative efficiency, but lower 
when we do.      
A clearer picture is obtained by the diagrammatic representation of the results 
discussed above. Fig. 1 presents kernel density functions of technical efficiency for 
models with TE and T&AE. There is an apparent parallel shift to the left when the 
model includes allocative inefficiency. Results from the model with technical 
  17inefficiency show that efficiency scores below 70% are highly improbable, whereas 
this occurs at around 60% when we include allocative inefficiency. The scatterplot of 
the ranking of banks’ TE obtained from the SURT model against that obtained from 
the SURT&A model is provided in Fig. 2. The correlation between these rankings is 
fairly high, although there exist some outliers. Yet, if the focus is on individual bank 
efficiency, a choice between models cannot be made, given the high degree of 
correlation of efficiency rankings between the two models.  
Fig. 3 illustrates the kernel density function of the allocative efficiency 
estimates, showing that the range of the allocative efficiency scores is wider than 
those of technical efficiency. Therefore, there exists a broader array of firms that are 
allocative inefficient. One could then identify which set of inputs is the major source 
of this inefficiency by looking at the kernel density functions of the ξs and ηs. The 
density functions of allocative inefficiency parameters (price distortion ξj) are 
reported in Fig. 4. These density functions, even though centered around zero (which 
means that banks on average do not seem to have significant relative price 
distortions), differ in terms of spread and overall shape. For loanable funds (input 1), 
relative price distortions (ξ1) can be as large as 4% with a peak at around –1%, 
whereas for labor (input 2) the spread is much lower and the peak is very close to 
zero. This reflects the fact that for loanable funds banks seem to misperceive prices, 
while they seem to manage labor costs efficiently. Finally, the fact that the density 
function of ξ1 is not particularly tight means that banks are quite heterogeneous in 
terms of allocative inefficiency.  
Fig. 5 presents the country-specific temporal variation of overall efficiency 
(calculated as the average of each country’s individual bank efficiencies).
19 Banks in 
Austria, Germany, Ireland and Luxembourg considerably improved their efficiency. 
These results are not surprising: In Austria, the five largest banks have seen 
fundamental changes in their ownership structure, including mergers. In Germany, 
even though concentration remains low, the number of credit institutions decreased by 
540 only between 1998 and 2000 (see ECB, 2002). Finally, Irish banks have become 
more efficient possibly due to significant improvement in their operating expenses 
                                                                                                                                            
18 The reported values are averages of the bank-specific estimates across countries (Table 4a) and 
across years (Table 4b). Technical efficiency is calculated using eq. 17 and allocative efficiency as 
described in the rest of Section 4.  
19 A graph for Sweden is not reported, since it shows quite a bit of volatility due to the small number of 
banks included in the sample. 
  18management coupled with the strong economic growth of the period.
20 On the other 
hand, the Spanish banking system was the only one to see a slight decline in its 
efficiency.   
Finally, in Table 5 we report the average technical change across countries 
(again calculated as the average of the bank-specific estimates across countries), 
measured by the derivative of the estimated cost function with respect to the time 
trend. The main finding is that technical change positively contributed to the annual 
cost of banks, especially in Denmark, Ireland and Italy. However, we should treat 
these estimates with great caution, given the problems associated with the use of a 
time trend as a proxy for technical change (Hunter and Timme, 1991).          
Policy implications are straightforward. Banks should focus on reducing 
managerial and other inefficiencies rather than trying to exploit economies of scale in 
the rather competitive European banking framework, and estimates show that this has 
recently been their main policy objective. Apparently, deregulation, liberalization and 
ongoing financial integration have increased the need for better quality management 
and forced banks to operate more rationally. In this context, banks’ policy objective 
should be twofold, although this tends to be overlooked by the literature. The first 
objective reflects their ability to maximize output from a given set of inputs (TE), 
while the second involves their ability to optimize the amount of inputs to be used, 
given prices (AE). Banks, on average, stand to gain an additional 18% improvement 
from output maximization and a 16% improvement from a better allocation of their 
inputs (see last row of Table 4b). Yet, we should note that this study examined the 
efficiency of commercial banks only, which are on average characterized by higher 
inefficiencies.         
 
6. Conclusions 
  The world of European banking is in a constant state of flux, as bankers, 
governments and the European Commission react to the pressures produced by new 
competition, new technology and growing globalization. As the level of sophistication 
                                                 
20 Luxembourg is a unique case, not easily comparable with other EU banking systems, mainly due to 
the fact that few of the banks operating in Luxembourg are active in the domestic market and other 
legal reasons. Cost efficiencies are achieved by offering a broad range of products or services to a very 
large customer base (which could originate e.g. from the large fixed costs incurred in gathering an 
information data base to be used for providing a large set of services).  
  19in the operation of the banking sector improves, there is evidently less gain to be 
exploited from economies of scale, while there is still considerable room for 
improvement stemming from higher levels of efficiency.  
  We contend that overall economic efficiency of banks should be modeled 
along the proposition of Farrell (1957), who decomposed it into its technical and 
allocative components. In the present paper, we exploited the relationship derived in 
Kumbhakar (1997) to overcome the problems associated with estimation of both 
technical and allocative inefficiency using flexible functional forms, known in the 
literature as the Greene problem. Next we described the empirical implementation of 
this model on a panel dataset of commercial banks of 13 EU countries.  
  The findings suggest that both the technical and allocative components 
significantly contribute to overall inefficiency, while exclusion of the latter from the 
model biases TE and, therefore, the overall efficiency level. The most technically 
efficient banking sectors were found to be those of Austria, Germany and the UK, the 
same sectors also recording the lower allocative inefficiency scores. In contrast, the 
banking sectors of Ireland, Portugal and Italy have much more to gain from improving 
their efficiency level. The high allocative inefficiency and its degree of differentiation 
in terms of the efficiency scores among the countries examined suggest that much is 
to be done regarding the optimization of banking inputs’ usage and management. 
Since the efficient use of individual inputs in banking is substantially 
underinvestigated, this is a desideratum for future research.        
 
  20Appendix 
The task is to find the first derivatives of the cost function and share equations 
with respect to the ξ 's, and evaluate them at  1 0 − = M ξ . Omitting observation 
subscripts and error terms for simplicity, the cost function is 
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and   is the usual translog cost function. Clearly, assuming all restrictions implied 
by the theory in place, we get 
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Therefore,  0
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AL C . Since  0 ln
0
=
= ξ
AL C , the cost function contributes 
nothing to the conditional posterior of ξ  up to a first order of approximation. This is 
particularly important because the cost function is the most complicated function of 
the system, and omitting the cost function from further consideration results in 
computational gain.  Next, we consider the share equations. These are given by 
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0 ξ ξ . Moreover, it is easy to show that 
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After some algebra, the derivatives of the allocative inefficiency term with 
respect to ξ 's are  
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j
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ξ
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ξ
+ − − =
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0
1  if  j m = , and  , if  mj j mS S β +
0 0 j m ≠ . 
These partial derivatives are simple functions of the data and β , and can be computed 
easily at no cost conditional on the  s ' β .  
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  25Table 1 
Descriptive statistics of the variables 
Variable Definition  Mean Std  Dev
TC  Total operating and financial cost  119621 361552 
y1 The value of total aggregate loans  871028 3126397 
y2 The value of transaction deposits  1300930 3843171 
y3 The value of total other earning assets  779460 2368579 
w1 Price of funds (interest paid on total funds/total funds)  0.0348 0.0210 
w2 Price of labor (total personnel expenses/total assets)  0.0152 0.0112 
w3 Price of physical capital (total depreciation and other capital expenses/total assets)  0.0188 0.0160 
T  A trend variable (calculated as the deviation from year 1996)   
E  Capital ratio (total equity/total assets)  0.0888 0.0545 
Number of observations: 3935 
The figures have been deflated using country-specific CPI indices with 1995 as a base year. 
To define the price of labor and the price of physical capital we use total assets instead of the number of employees and the value of fixed assets 
respectively, since the BankScope database does not include comprehensive information on these measures.  
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 Table 2 
Estimation results 
  OLS
1 SUR
2 SURT
3 MLNM
4 SURT&A
5
Variables Coef. S.E Coef. S.E Coef. S.E   Coef. S.E
Constant 3.1460 0.1792 3.2048 0.0094 3.0770 0.0338 3.0720 2.9748 0.0377
w1 0.5226 0.0238 0.3708 0.0059 0.3760 0.0054 0.2858 0.2789 0.0062
w2 0.1725 0.0379 0.3070 0.0064 0.3029 0.0053 0.3064 0.3486 0.0063
y1 0.6190 0.0224 0.5601 0.0165 0.6007 0.0159 0.6048 0.6119 0.0200
y2 -0.3470 0.0425 -0.3177 0.0315 -0.3850 0.0163 -0.3769 -0.3972 0.0172
y3 0.5458 0.0224 0.5883 0.0207 0.6129 0.0182 0.6163 0.6490 0.0150
T -0.0009 0.0106 -0.0170 0.0101 -0.0031 0.0076 -0.0408 -0.0506 0.0064
E -1.9688 0.5584 -1.9326 0.0081 -1.9755 0.0139 -1.7247 -1.7650 0.0122
w1 w1/2 0.2236 0.0031 0.1982 0.0007 0.1984 0.0006 0.1064 0.0874 0.0062
w1 w2 -0.1026 0.0037 -0.0884 0.0006 -0.0883 0.0006 -0.0395 -0.0342 0.0023
w1 y1 0.0279 0.0019 0.0017 0.0006 0.0023 0.0006 0.0033 -0.0085 0.0034
w1 y2 -0.0718 0.0041 -0.0062 0.0011 -0.0078 0.0011 -0.0058 -0.0007 0.0021
w1 y3 0.0314 0.0024 0.0037 0.0007 0.0043 0.0006 0.0095 0.0175 0.0014
w1 T  0.0039 0.0010 -0.0006 0.0003 -0.0006 0.0003 0.0034 -0.0005 0.0011
w1 E  -0.1810 0.0406 -0.0447 0.0116 -0.0482 0.0076 0.0987 0.1693 0.0222
w2 w2/2 0.1596 0.0057 0.1427 0.0010 0.1424 0.0009 0.2286 0.2016 0.0052
w2 y1   -0.0351 0.0028 0.0019 0.0006 0.0018 0.0006 0.0113 0.0035 0.0008
w2 y2 0.0618 0.0055 -0.0005 0.0012 0.0003 0.0011 -0.0183 0.0023 0.0012
w2 y3 -0.0189 0.0031 -0.0008 0.0007 -0.0013 0.0006 0.0071 -0.0094 0.0017
w2 T  -0.0018 0.0015 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0010 0.0010 0.0003
w2 E  0.2480 0.0677 0.0032 0.0120 0.0070 0.0074 0.0975 -0.0562 0.0219
y1 y1/2 0.1031 0.0015 0.1062 0.0015 0.0862 0.0015 0.0858 0.0841 0.0014
y1 y2 0.0384 0.0035 0.0331 0.0027 0.0532 0.0038 0.0530 0.0775 0.0021
y1 y3 -0.1626 0.0038 -0.1501 0.0030 -0.1540 0.0035 -0.1544 -0.1746 0.0023
y1 T  0.0082 0.0009 0.0058 0.0009 0.0035 0.0009 0.0031 -0.0025 0.0012
y1 E  -0.0916 0.0417 -0.2783 0.0247 -0.4346 0.0353 -0.4252 -0.5100 0.0451
y2 y2/2 -0.0215 0.0059 -0.0105 0.0045 -0.0499 0.0080 -0.0489 -0.0915 0.0053
y2 y3 0.0278 0.0040 0.0076 0.0030 0.0352 0.0045 0.0355 0.0492 0.0041
y2 T  -0.0111 0.0017 -0.0070 0.0017 -0.0041 0.0016 -0.0047 0.0029 0.0020
y2 E  0.3301 0.0865 0.7490 0.0660 1.0054 0.0650 0.9546 1.1372 0.0949
y3 y3/2 0.1236 0.0023 0.1336 0.0022 0.1059 0.0027 0.1039 0.1117 0.0040
y3 T  0.0039 0.0009 0.0040 0.0010 0.0022 0.0010 0.0034 0.0023 0.0012
y3 E  -0.1189 0.0536 -0.3952 0.0465 -0.4964 0.0455 -0.5490 -0.6761 0.0597
TT/2 0.0028 0.0009 0.0019 0.0009 0.0008 0.0008 0.0112 0.0063 0.0010
TE 0.0005 0.0188 0.0106 0.0168 0.0078 0.0132 -0.0389 0.0930 0.0289
EE/2 4.3675 1.1507 4.3705 0.0056 4.3527 0.0080 4.4962 4.5011 0.0130
  0.0527 0.0033 0.1811 0.1350 0.0088
 σu      0.1802 0.0045 0.3878 0.3393 0.0208
Notes: 
1.  Simple OLS estimation of cost function. 
2.  SUR estimation of translog cost share system. 
3.  SUR estimation of translog cost share system with technical inefficiency. 
4.  Approximate system with technical inefficiency (the ML estimate is obtained from Nelder-Mead simplex). 
5.  Estimation of approximate translog cost share system with technical and allocative inefficiency. 
  27Table 3  
Temporal variation of scale economies of European banks 
 OLS SUR SURT SURT&A
1996 0.9968 0.9886 0.9945 0.9922
1997 0.9991 0.9919 0.9969 0.9942
1998 1.0017 0.9955 0.9994 0.9956
1999 1.0077 1.0004 1.0036 0.9985
2000 1.0072 1.0035 1.0055 1.0014
2001 1.0099 1.0068 1.0080 1.0030
2002 1.0144 1.0104 1.0107 1.0045
2003 1.0194 1.0149 1.0143 1.0065
Overall  1.0065 1.0009 1.0037 0.9992
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Table 4 
(a) Average efficiency levels of European banks by country  
Country TE  (SURT) TE (SURT&A) ξ1 ξ2 η1 η2 1-lnC
AL
Austria  0.8736 0.8032 -0.3699 -0.0081 0.0356 -0.0107 0.792
Belgium  0.8888 0.7998 -0.2883 -0.1914 0.0156 -0.0478 0.784
Denmark  0.8453 0.7679 -0.3983 -0.0181 0.0398 0.0107 0.713
France  0.8948 0.7976 -0.1776 -0.0475 0.0171 -0.0230 0.782
Germany  0.8983 0.8047 -0.2321 -0.1302 0.0112 -0.0255 0.794
Ireland  0.8887 0.7281 -1.2091 0.0854 0.1462 -0.0686 0.631
Italy  0.8460 0.7553 -0.6572 0.0613 0.0878 -0.0564 0.687
Luxembourg  0.8758 0.7623 -0.9090 -0.0166 0.1120 -0.0894 0.705
Netherlands  0.8896 0.7583 -0.6339 -0.0151 0.0773 -0.0546 0.693
Portugal  0.8544 0.7442 -1.0118 0.0784 0.1449 -0.0849 0.663
Spain  0.8599 0.7937 -0.4032 -0.0145 0.0434 -0.0261 0.769
Sweden  0.9043 0.7587 -0.7775 0.0200 0.0965 -0.0623 0.699
UK  0.9011 0.8022 -0.3157 -0.0301 0.0306 -0.0326 0.791
Overall  0.8784 0.7852 -0.4263 -0.0360 0.0464 -0.0362 0.753
 
 
 
(b) Temporal variation of average efficiency levels 
Years TE  (SURT) TE (SURT&A) ξ1 ξ2 η1 η2 1-lnC
AL
1996 0.8842 0.7728 -0.7268 -0.0826 0.0884 -0.0826 0.723
1997 0.8814 0.7691 -0.6427 -0.0637 0.0757 -0.0632 0.717
1998 0.8851 0.7694 -0.5621 -0.0531 0.0652 -0.0440 0.717
1999 0.8839 0.7790 -0.3647 -0.0674 0.0355 -0.0285 0.738
2000 0.8774 0.7793 -0.4401 -0.0370 0.0474 -0.0377 0.739
2001 0.8744 0.7903 -0.3731 -0.0108 0.0397 -0.0217 0.765
2002 0.8694 0.8080 -0.1858 0.0149 0.0133 -0.0071 0.805
2003 0.8686 0.8236 0.0089 0.0309 -0.0109 0.0098 0.840
Note:  
TE (SURT): Technical efficiency estimated from the model with technical efficiency only; TE (SURT&A): 
Technical efficiency estimated from the model with technical and allocative efficiency. 
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Table 5  
Technical change in European banks 1996-2003 
 OLS SUR SURT SURT&A
Austria 0.020 0.022 0.019 0.027
Belgium 0.019 0.021 0.018 0.025
Denmark 0.025 0.028 0.022 0.034
France 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.023
Germany 0.016 0.018 0.017 0.022
Ireland 0.026 0.026 0.021 0.036
Italy 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.032
Luxembourg 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.027
Netherlands 0.017 0.018 0.017 0.015
Portugal 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.018
Spain 0.021 0.023 0.020 0.027
Sweden 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.018
UK 0.017 0.020 0.018 0.017
Overall 0.018 0.020 0.018 0.025
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